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INTRODUCTION
The rapid evolution of environmental problems and greater public awareness andconcern, bring pressure on governments to unify sustainable development policiesand develop more credible approaches to implementation. Before the responses of
governments could be explored, the question should be asked what does the implemen-
tation of sustainable development mean in practical terms and how can it be achieved?
In the sustainable development literature which focuses on implementation issues, the
single most recurring concept is that of integration: be it policy integration; integrated
planning; organisational coordination and integration; integrated environmental man-
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ABSTRACT
It could be argued that the quest for integration is at the core of sustainable devel-opment implementation issues. Although there is no simple answer to the inte-gration challenge there is no doubt that organisational integration and coordi-
nation comprise a critical ingredient in any prescription package. The reasons why
it is difficult to achieve integration is encapsulated by the notion of the ‘limits to
governance’ which describe the organisational complexities and constraints facing
traditional governance. At the basic theoretical level the interactions between
organisations are explained in terms of the two organising principles of competi-
tion and collaboration, while coordination could be a product of three alternative
modes of governance. The general acceptance of the idea that a decentralised set
of formal and informal agreements among diverse groups and organisations in the
form of networks and partnerships holds the most promising institutional prospect,
is explored in from two angles: firstly from a macro perspective considering the
changing role of the state and secondly a bottom-up perspective focusing on the
notion of organisational innovation in resource management. Finally some con-
clusions are drawn as to the prospects of networks being able to achieve integra-
tion and coordination in environmental management.
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agement systems; integrated information; or monitoring and evaluation systems. In short,
it could be argued that the quest for integration is at the core of sustainable development
implementation issues. So why is it seemingly so difficult to develop integrated manage-
ment approaches and what can or are being done in this regard?
As there is a strong organisational dimension in this challenge, the emphasis in this
article will fall on the role of institutional arrangements in fostering coordination and
achieving the integration sought after in the management of sustainable development.
Firstly, to think about and understand the main constraints on more integrated manage-
ment approaches, the problem is illuminated by the notion of ‘limits to governance’ is
described as a point of departure. Secondly the basic theoretical underpinnings and mo-
dels are analysed that can be utilised to clarify and to develop an understanding of the
interactions between organisations in the search for coordination. Thirdly the responses
are explored, both from a macro perspective in terms of general approaches adopted by
governments as well as from a micro perspective in terms of organisational innovation.
Fourthly some emerging practical implications for the management of sustainable devel-
opment are offered for consideration before the final conclusions are drawn. 
THE PROBLEM: THE LIMITS TO GOVERNANCE
As modern society becomes more complex and diverse, governments find itincreasingly difficult to perform their management functions effectively (Kooimanand Van der Vliet, 1995, as quoted by Symes (1997:108). At the very time that an
efficient, effective and well-coordinated government is perhaps most needed it is a quest
rather than a reality: governments can depend on the formal structure of the public sec-
tor to produce coordination even less than in the past. The nature of contemporary gov-
ernment exacerbates their inherent coordination problems: the increasingly cross-cut-
ting nature of issues (of which sustainable development is a prime example), the contri-
bution of decentralisation trends towards incoherence, the disaggregation of structures
into multiple agencies and multiplying activities (Peters, 1998: 295-296). In similar vain
Carley and Cristie (2000:141) argue that a main organisational constraint on manage-
ment for sustainability is the notion of ‘limits to governance’ which flow from limiting
factors such as the tension between centralising and decentralising forces, the dynamic
nature of the modern world with its endemic uncertainty and the ‘fragmentation’ in po-
licy and institutional terms of contemporary societies.
According to Steward (1991) as quoted by Carley and Cristie (2000: 175), it is wide-
ly assumed that environmental issues can be dealt with in the same way as other gov-
ernmental activities. However, the complex inter-relationships demand holistic thinking
and a new multi-level, multi-organisational approach – presenting a challenge to tradi-
tional government organisational and management structures. What is known to be the
case, is that major problems always occur at the boundaries – among states, among le-
vels of government, among departments of state, among agencies, among divisions with-
in departments. To this list can be added between the public and the private sector (and
the non-governmental sector), between government and the scientific community, and
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between government policy level and community level. Effective managers can manage
what is theirs but falter when it comes to boundary questions (Eddison, 1985: 148). 
So why is it so difficult to achieve integration and what are the main constraints on
more integrated management approaches? Some of the important factors in the limits to
governance according to Carley & Christie (2000:143-154) are:
• the complexity of environmental problems precludes straightforward cause-and-
effect analysis of the problems, and also precludes simple solutions implemented
by any government agency acting alone. Just as one agency is unlikely to resolve
such a problem, so also is one government acting alone.
• The failure of the traditional command and control bureaucracies which are not
well suited in dealing with the rapid 'unplanned' change which is becoming more
typical of environmental problems, in which knowledge of the problem, and the
problem itself, evolves rapidly, and for which any solution must involve overlap-
ping public, private and voluntary sector initiatives.
• an adequate definition of environmental problems based on single discipline per-
ceptions and solutions is absent.
• The ‘administrative trap’ which describes the common mismatch between the
nature of the environmental problems and the sectoral problem-solving structures
in government, which disaggregate ecological problems, recognise and treat symp-
toms as the problem itself, and generally remain inadequate to the task – the fail-
ure of horizontal integration.
• Poor vertical integration, which is the result of the common failure of understand-
ing and information flows between the policy levels of government and the end
resource users, may generate substantial, cumulative environmental impacts.
• Over-reliance on institutional reform: although institutional reform is often part of
a high quality management approach, there is a common tendency to assume that
if the "right" institutional arrangement can be brought into being, adequate envi-
ronmental management will result.
• Failure to learn from experience: within the traditional bureaucracy there is often
little motivation to learn from past experience and even less to admit, analyse and
learn from past mistakes.
• Failure to confront the management process: most politicians and bureaucrats in pub-
lic decision making and management have little interest in improving the process of
decision making, and indeed, little interest in considering the process at all.
Having understood the range of constraints on integration, it is necessary to focus on
some of the basic concepts which are at the core of the integration challenge. Some
insights into and pointers to future prospects for achieving coordination in managing for
sustainable development are requrired. The most promising institutional prospect for
integrated resource management is, according to Nelson and Weschler (1998: 565), a
decentralised set of formal and informal agreements among diverse groups and organi-
sations that can address the resource issues and orient other management activities to the
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well-being of the resource. The question here is what will entice diverse groups and
organisations with different interests to collaborate instead of compete?
COORDINATION THROUGH COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION
The first point to clarify is: what does ‘coordination’ in the context of achieving inte-gration in sustainable development policy and action actually mean? Peters (1998:296) states that the term coordination is used to refer to an end-state in which the
policies and programmes of government are characterised by minimal redundancy
(when two organisations perform the same task), incoherence (when policies with the
same clients have different goals and requirements) and lacunae (when no organisation
performs a necessary task).
The two organising principles which can be utilised to develop an understanding of
the interactions between organisations are competition and collaboration: the competi-
tive imperatives implicit in the resource dependency approach explain alliances among
organisations as responses to current or potential threats from competitors or the per-
ceived opportunity to expand domains. In the process, influence is extended and new
resources are secured. Collaboration theory is characterised by a notion of synergistic
gain and programme enhancement from sharing resources, risks and rewards and the pri-
oritising of collaborative rather than competitive advantage. The advantage is viewed as
a broad range of benefits, some of which will not be definable at the start of the rela-
tionship. There is a tension between the harsh realities of the resource environment and
the need to collaborate: contest, domain invasion and temporary alliances to achieve
competitive advantage in the context of self-interest. Simultaneously the criteria for fund-
ing regimes stress co-operation and partnership building (Lowndes & Skelcher,
1998:317).
Peters (1998: 306) argues that coordination is becoming more difficult because of the
shifting nature of issues: some conventional central agencies are becoming relatively less
important while other, less conventional ones are gaining importance (i.e. globalisation
means that foreign ministries become increasingly central players in what had been
domestic policy concerns). In addition, the environment has become an overriding issue
and environmental agencies now play central roles much as ministries for finance in the
past. Another important source of change is the increasing importance of international
and regional associations in domestic policy.
In all the theoretical models of coordination there is, according to Peters (1998: 298),
an assumption of some difference of interest among participants, whether as a result of dif-
ferences in policy preferences or simply defence of bureaucratic turf. It has been argued
that coordination can be a product of three alternative ‘governing structures’. The concept
governance refers to ways in which coordination is achieved and sustained within eco-
nomic and social life. According to Lowndes & Skelcher (1998:318) three ideal types of
modes of governance emerge namely hierarchy, markets, and networks.
The typical conceptualisation of coordination in government is as a top-down hier-
archy dependent upon central agencies. This mode overcomes, in theory at least, the
problems of coordination and collaboration found in the market place. This approach to
coordination functions well as long as the organisation or organisations involved are well
integrated from top to bottom and they have a clear mandate about what to do. The
imposition of an authoritative integrating and supervisory structure enables bureaucratic
routines to be established. Coordination can be undertaken by administrative fiat, and
the employment relationships pertaining within the organisation encourage at least a
level of commitment by staff. The cost, however, is a reduction in flexibility and innova-
tion because of a tendency to formalisation and routinization. Peters (1998: 298) points
out that if organisations are structured more loosely or are involved in complex policy
areas, requiring multiple information exchanges and interactions with a number of dif-
ferent organisations, the efficacy of hierarchy is reduced. In the hierarchy the need to bar-
gain and to develop ad hoc understandings is reduced, while the negotiation and bar-
gaining associated with both markets and networks impose high transaction costs. 
A market mode which revolves around contractual relationships over property rights
is the most commonly proposed alternative to hierarchical coordination. The basic
assumption is that coordination can be achieved through the “invisible hand” of the self-
interest of participants. Price mechanisms are the means by which the relationships
between participants are mediated and where conflicts emerge there may be haggling or
recourse to law in order to determine the liabilities of the parties involved. Markets pro-
vide a high degree of flexibility to actors in determining their willingness to form
alliances, although the competitive nature of the environment and the parties’ underly-
ing suspicion may limit the degree of commitment to any collaborative venture.
Essentially, actors prefer to be independent and will choose to collaborate only when
they identify particular advantages to themselves. This type of coordination involves the
willingness of the participants to exchange resources (money, contracts, information or
even clients). Peters (1998: 298), however, notes that in many cases the capacity for
direct exchange is absent and market-like mechanisms are not readily applicable in pub-
lic service delivery, and the conventional pattern of behaviour in government has been
to conform to law rather than to bargains.
As more open conceptions of governance become the norm, networks are seen as the
most likely mechanisms to achieve coordination especially in so far the coordination of
public and private action is concerned. This mode arises from a view that actors are able
to identify complementary interest. The development of interdependent relationships
based on trust, loyalty and reciprocity enable collaborative activity to be developed and
maintained. Being voluntary, networks maintain the loyalty of members over the longer
term. Conflicts are resolved within the network on the basis of members’ reputational
concerns. Apart from the advantage of being more open to the role of non-governmen-
tal organisations or NGOs, networks can contribute to solutions for problems of distri-
bution and common value creation simultaneously.
One of the main consequences of the Rio summit was the realisation that NGOs have
an important role to play in the protection of the environment. NGOs have established
networks, often linking developed and underdeveloped countries, which will render
increasingly difficult, the dumping of one country's environmental hazards on another. It
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may be a sign of the times that some industries' greatest challenge may come not from
formal governments, but from forces that are even more flexible and informal than the
private sector itself, such as Greenpeace which has the financial and logistical capacity
to operate world wide (Mercier, 1994:354).
It is helpful to distinguish between environmentalist NGOs and community-based
NGOs (Carley & Cristie, 2000:182): Environmentalist NGOs now engage in research,
coordination of funding and protest actions at the international and sub-international
level. They can also target specific issues, generate widespread public interest, lobby key
politicians, and pressure public agencies. Community-based NGOs are usually more
local in orientation but can have a wider brief than environmentalist NGOs in that their
concerns will be more geared to the overall development of their locality. In terms of
building networks, it is important that every effort be made to extend the partnership to
encompass relevant community-based NGOs. Peters (1998: 299) cautions that linkages
to other organisations, public and private, may produce an inter-organisational version
of the tragedy of the commons in which single organisation rationality is in conflict with
collective rationality: each organisation may be serving its network, but that may inhibit
coordination within the larger population of organisations.
ACTION NETWORKS AND MULTI-ORGANISATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
In this section the response to action networks and multi-organisational partnershipswill be analysed from two angles: first from a macro perspective in terms of the roleof the state and the general approaches utilised. Secondly organisational innovation is
explored from a micro perspective or bottom-up perspective.
Response from the Top: The Role of the State
What is becoming increasingly certain, according to Cooper (1995:185), is that there is
a move towards a hybrid state, in which most governments seek less command and con-
trol regulation, more decentralisation, reduction in the size of the public sector and
increased use of market-based policy tools. A widespread response has been to reduce
the role of the state by contracting out several of its former functions to create systems of
devolved management, partly aligned to the New Right philosophies of the market eco-
nomy. At the same time, there are areas such as environmental management in which
there are very definite limits to those trends such that government will continue to play
a regulatory role, even if it employs economic incentives and other financial devices.
Given concerns about nuclear wastes, global demands for action in several fields from
air pollution to transnational shipment of hazardous waste, and increasing pressure on
local communities to do something about their own environmental problems are priori-
ty issues. Public managers will continue to play an active role with regulation as one of
their functions. Given the changing context, the nature of regulation must change. There
seems to be a moving towards a future emphasising parallel system of management in
which public managers must simultaneously manage within government, outside gov-
ernment and across governments.
As no single actor, public or private, has all the knowledge and information required to
solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems, no actor has sufficient overview to make
the application of needed instruments effective. No single actor has sufficient action poten-
tial to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model. The task of government, there-
fore, is to combine different groups of actors and to create different arrangements for deal-
ing with management problems. Some may involve public-private partnerships and co-
responsibility. Most would aim to reduce the state’s direct role in regulation. Governance,
in the words of Rhodes (1996) is about managing networks (Symes, 1997:109).
Collaborations among various sectors of the governance system cannot address all
the issues of resource and environmental management, but collaborations can provide
resources, technical assistance, moral support and civic leadership for addressing signi-
ficant threats to the quality of life. The term institutional readiness is used to refer to the
degree to which jurisdictions are aware of and primed to engage each other in collabo-
rative governance. In the management of water catchment areas for example, basin-wide
collaboration, including formal and informal linkages, promise to move environmental
management beyond the parochial stances of local interests and expectations.
Collaboration among communities and agencies are most effectively carried out in a
well-developed, open system of governance. Democratic collaboration among leaders
and citizens, agency administrators and communities is a goal achieved only through its
practice, the issue is the degree to which participants in the various institutions of gov-
ernance have experience of and practice in collaborative decision making and policy
implementation. The critical question is: are they experienced in the democratic gover-
nance of a regional resource system? (Nelson and Weschler, 1998: 566-567).
The literature of interjurisdictional and intersectoral cooperation suggest that there
are four observable conditions that indicate potential institutional readiness to engage in
cross-sectional collaborations. Firstly the level of citizen and community interest and
involvement; secondly the availability of existing institutions and organisations for
regional governance; thirdly the degree of practical experience in formal and informal
cross-sectional coordination and cooperation; and fourthly the amount of knowledge of
and appreciation for the missions, goals and objectives of the other participants (Nelson
and Weschler, 1998: 567).
How then, might one start the process of reducing the state’s direct intervention in
sustainable resource management? According to Symes (1997:110-112), the tendency in
recent years has been that attempts trying to resolve this issue, is dominated by three
approaches, each derived from distinctly different theoretical perspectives, championed
by different disciplinary traditions. The approaches are firstly the privatisation of use
rights, secondly co-management, involving a sharing of management between the state
and responsible user group organisations and thirdly decentralisation of management
through the regionalisation of policy.
The market economy approach originates, not surprisingly, from neo-classical eco-
nomic theory, and a somehow, simplistic analyses of common use rights as implying a
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condition of open access in which the only source of regulatory control is the state whose
interventions distort the conditions of a free market. Thus, the discipline of the market
largely substitutes the rule of law required by state management.
By contrast, the co-management approach has its origins in social science theory and
in the research findings of social anthropologists, which point to the ability of local user
groups to manage their resources effectively through sophisticated systems of self-regu-
lation based on sound empirical knowledge of local ecosystems. The ‘rule of law’ is
replaced, in some measure, by consensual decision making and an enhanced compli-
ance resulting from a switch from an imposed to a negotiated regulation.
The regionalisation approach stems form the operational principle of subsidiarity or
proximity, which argues that policy decisions are best made by those who are located
closest to the theatre of operations. Symes (1997: 112) is of the opinion that there are no
fundamental reasons why privatisation, co-management and regionalisation should not
be joined together in an integrated approach.
Bottom-up Responses: Organisational Innovation
The 1990s are seen as the “Age of the Network” characterised by modes of governance
that link public, private, community and voluntary sector actors. The logic flows from the
complexity of environmental problems, which preclude straight-forward cause-and-
effect analysis of the problems, and also preclude simple solutions implemented by any
agency acting alone. The inability of traditional governmental bureaucracies, working on
their own or vertically with international bureaucracies, to deal with complex environ-
ment and development problems led Carley & Cristie (2000:175-176) to suggest the
development of what they call action networks for environmental management.
In technical terms, networks are non-hierarchical social systems which constitute the
basic social form that permits an inter-organisational coalition to develop. An action net-
work, linking the public, private and voluntary sectors should be flexible, open and capa-
ble of restructuring itself over time. Unlike the loose linkages in the more usual informa-
tion-sharing networks, the action network is focused on the goals of its management and
research tasks, and engages in regular, critical review of its progress towards these goals.
The networks function at a number of levels:
• as growing constituencies for sustainable development, fostering an ongoing poli-
tical process of mediation and the building of consensus even where conflict is
bound to be pervasive
• as a vehicle for new partnerships among government, business and non-govern-
mental and community groups
• as groups of public managers and natural resource scientists with a commitment to
mutual learning to develop a new range of skills in environmental management and
• in multi-layered 'nested` networks, as a means of integrating efforts at sustainable
development from the local to the international level.
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For the purposes of this article no distinction is made between the network and partner-
ship forms of organisation (following the example of Carley and Cristie who are using the
terms interchangeably). Some authors make distinctions in terms of formalisation or life-
cycle phases. The network is seen by Lowndes & Skelcher (1998:314) as the more infor-
mal arrangement whereas multi-organisational partnerships are formalised by an agree-
ment between the parties, which are given concrete expression through the creation of
an organisational structure, e.g. a partnership board or forum. Here, strategy is devel-
oped and decisions are made which may have implications for the policies, resources
and actions of the individual agencies involved.
The network and partnership can also be viewed as different stages in a life cycle
model. A four-stage life cycle for partnerships is proposed by Lowndes & Skelcher,
(1998:320) which incorporates the different modes of governance: the pre-partnership
collaboration; partnership creation; partnership programme delivery; and partnership
termination. A different mode of governance – network, market and hierarchy – pre-
dominates each stage. The pre-partnership collaboration is characterised by a network
mode based upon informality, trust and a sense of common purpose. The partnership cre-
ation and consolidation is characterised by hierarchy based upon an assertion of status
and authority differentials and the formalisation of procedures. The partnership pro-
gramme delivery is characterised by market (or quasi-market) mechanisms of tendering
and contract, with low levels of cooperation between providers. The partnership termi-
nation or succession is characterised by a re-assertion of a network mode as a means to
maintain agency commitment, community involvement and staff employment. The key
challenge for partnerships lies in managing the interaction of different modes of gover-
nance, which at some stage will generate competition and at other points collaboration.
The emergence and growth of networks and multi-organisational partnerships are
explained by Lowndes & Skelcher (1998:315) on the grounds of:
• resource dependency issues which stimulated governmental bodies to find ways of
delivering more with less by making better use of existing resources by reducing
duplication, add value by bringing together complementary services and fostering
innovation and synergy, and enabling the levering-in of new resources – either by
enabling access to grant regimes requiring financial and in-kind contributions from
private and voluntary sectors or using private sector partners to overcome public
sector constraints on access to capital markets;
• the search by public bodies for integration within an increasingly fragmented
organisational landscape arising from the new quasi-market environment;
• it reflects the complexity and intransigence of issues facing government i.e. issues
that can only be tacked by bringing together the resources of a range of different
providers and interest groups to obtain the apparently tidy hierarchy of the public
bureaucracy being reshaped to establish lateral, diagonal and vertical relationships
with other bodies operating at different tiers and in associated policy fields; and
• a desire to address in innovative ways those issues that cross organisational bound-
aries.
Increasingly, forward thinking public managers are sanctioning the involvement of such
task-oriented, less formal groups in environmental management (Carley & Cristie,
2000:176). These groups define environmental problems in a more holistic and practical
fashion, and work to develop consensus on the way forward. These kinds of innovations
are not however, a replacement for the traditional bureaucracy, as they do not carry out
any routine functions of government. Rather, government will find it helpful to partici-
pate in such networks, as a partner with business and community groups in tackling
problems in environmental management.
The characteristics of these parallel action networks are:
• flat, flexible, organisational structures involving teamwork or partnerships
• imply equality of relationships among all relevant stakeholders
• require vision and value-driven leadership
• emphasise participation and organisational learning
• undertaking continuous performance review and improvement and
• demand network development in which events progress at a pace which is politi-
cally and culturally sustainable, given local conditions.
Each partner in an action-centred network makes a contribution of relevant expertise and
enthusiasm, including representatives of government departments and agencies. But gov-
ernment also has an important overall societal role. This is a strategic role – the proac-
tive attempts to throw light on present action by considering possible positive futures. It
begins with some sense of the possibilities of the future, call it a vision, and uses this
vision to initiate the sub-processes of innovation, i.e. the agenda for the future - what
kind of society is expected, and commitment to implementation based on desire to
realise this envisaged future and not some other, less satisfactory one (Carley & Cristie,
2000:171).
The important dimensions of variation in networks that will influence their likelihood
of producing effective coordination according to Peters (1998: 301) are: firstly the degree
of pluriformity (some are so integrated that they can be treated as a single organisation
while others are little more than collections of autonomous organisations); secondly the
extent of interdependence (loosely coupled versus closely interconnected which influ-
ence styles of interaction and relationships); thirdly the level of formality; and finally the
nature of the instruments used (i.e. planning, formal regulations, contracts).
Although most analysis of networks are concerned with the vertical interactions of
interest groups and government organisations, one of the most important questions in the
analysis of the public sector is coordination among public organisations. Peters (1998:
308) cautions that the effective integration of networks vertically may limit the capacity
of the constituent organisations to coordinate successfully with other organisations and
other networks.
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SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
What are the practical implications for the management of sustainable devel-opment of which public resource managers should take notice of when mak-ing decisions on the day to day implementation issues? Some practical pointers
to consider are offered by Peters (1998: 304-308):
• Organisations that were closest together ideologically and that provided similar
types of service were the most difficult to coordinate. Several factors bind organi-
sations and individual officials across agencies, including role definition as a pro-
fessional and a primary concern for clients.
• The iterative nature of interaction promotes coordination compared to a once-off
event because it provides cooperation incentives for participants in the process to
achieve long-term gains. If decisions are seen as entirely once-off and separable,
each participant has incentives to maximise gains on each decision and not to
cooperate. Hierarchies and even markets are able to allocate resources in a single
interaction, but for networks to form, there must be some repetition and stability.
• The changing nature of governance, with continuing devolution of policy to lower
echelons of government means that creating coherence and some level of equali-
ty across subsystems will be a growing concern for national policy makers. In both
international and intergovernmental relations a country’s individual organisations
are less self-contained than they are in the typical relationship that occurs at only
a single level of government. 
• The typical image of coordination is as a “top down” process, with central agen-
cies or lead ministries forcing cooperation among subordinate organisations. In
practice, however, coordination is often a function of negotiations among the
lower echelons of organisations concerning specific issues or clients (i.e. one-stop
shopping). Many coordination problems can be solved by bargaining among
affected organisations, often at the lower echelons. The best strategy appears to be
to allow local organisations to devise their own plans, subject to central monitor-
ing. The essential element required for this type of coordination to function, is sub-
stantial latitude for local action, whether the decentralisation is to local govern-
ment institutions or to lower echelons of organisations. Therefore coordination
issues conceptualised as implementation issues are more likely to be resolved suc-
cessfully than are issues that are considered at the policy levels. Implementation
issues tend to be addressed at a lower level of an organisation and settled for indi-
vidual client issues, while policy debate emphasises issues of turf and organisa-
tional survival.
• Inter-organisational coordination efforts have a profound impact on the capacity of
governments to hold organisations accountable: one obvious issue in accountabil-
ity is the capacity to identify who did what, and that simple faculty is often lost
when organisations meld their actions and use complex networks for service deli-
very.
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
There is no simple answer to the integration challenge so central in the quest for sus-tainable development. It depends on the specific issue, i.e. the prescription couldbe a multidimensional package made up of varying doses of improving policy inte-
gration, developing integrated planning processes; coordinating multi layered and mul-
tilevel organisational actors across sectors; implementing integrated information man-
agement systems for policy; planning and monitoring; or even vision and value driven
leadership capable of rising above sectional interests and cultivating a holistic perspec-
tive. There is however no doubt that the organisational dimension is a crucial if not the
critical ingredient in this challenge.
The notion of the limits to governance eloquently describes the organisational com-
plexities and constraints facing traditional governance systems when it comes to inte-
grated environmental management. At the basic level the interactions between organisa-
tions can be explained in terms of the two organising principles of competition and col-
laboration and the tension between them in the context of the participating organisa-
tions’ self-interest. It has been argued that coordination can be a product of three alter-
native modes of governance namely hierarchy (the imposition of an authoritative inte-
grating and supervisory structure), markets (contractual relationships driven by the invi-
sible hand of self-interest of the participants) and networks (voluntary relationships based
on the view that actors are able to identify complementary interest). 
There seems be wide acceptance of the notion that a decentralised set of formal and
informal agreements among diverse groups and organisations in the form of networks or
partnerships hold the most promising institutional prospect for integrated resource man-
agement. As no single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and information
required to solve resource problems, no single actor has sufficient action potential to
dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model. The process of reducing the state’s
direct role has been dominated by three approaches: firstly the market economy
approach (the privatisation of use rights and the substitution of rule of law by the disci-
pline of the market), secondly co-management, involving a sharing of management
between the state and responsible user group organisations by consensual decision ma-
king; and thirdly decentralisation of management through the regionalisation of policy
decisions to those located closest to the theatre of operations. Although the approaches
are derived from distinctly different theoretical perspectives and championed by differ-
ent disciplinary traditions, there are no fundamental reasons why privatisation, co-man-
agement and regionalisation should not be joined together in an integrated approach.
The emergence and growth of networks and multi-organisational partnerships during
the 1990s – the Age of the Network – reflect the complexity and intransigence of issues,
the search for integration, issues of resource dependency and a desire to address those
issues that cross organisational boundaries in innovative ways. Many coordination prob-
lems can be solved by bargaining among affected organisations, often at the lower ech-
elons and the best strategy appears to be to allow local organisations to devise their own
plans, subject to central monitoring. Therefore it could be concluded that networks could
be particularly successful in achieving integration if there is substantial latitude for local
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action, whether the decentralisation is to local government insitutions or to lower eche-
lons of organisations. Coordination issues conceptualised as implementation issues are
more likely to be resolved successfully than are issues that are considered at the policy
levels. This is because implementation issues tend to be addressed at a lower level of an
organisation and settled for individual client issues, while policy debates emphasise
issues of turf and organisational survival.
Finally, although it is clear that the organisational dimension is a critical factor in inte-
grated environmental management, there is no single blueprint or model for achieving
coordination that will suffice for all problems and contexts. More likely the approach(es)
and governance mode(s) or combinations thereof will have to (a) fit the type of problem,
(b) work within the constraints and opportunities offered by the existing organisational
landscape/capacity and (c) take the local political, social, economic and cultural context
into consideration and adapt and innovate within that space. There are – unfortunately –
no simple answers! 
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